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iEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The City of Boston is averting a potential gap of $83
million between revenues and expenditures during the 1984
fiscal year by extensive use of the following list of
non-recurring revenues for normal operating purposes:
1. An unallocated balance of $17 million in the
1982 overlay deficit (tax refunds originally
raised as amounts in excess of overlay reserves
and subsequently charged to the Funding Loan
authorized by the Legislature)
.
2. The unexpended balance (as of June 30, 1983)
of $34 million in the Disproportionate Assessment
Fund, consisting of proceeds from the sale of the
Hynes Veterans Auditorium and from Funding Loan
bonds in excess of reimbursements to the City's
General Fund for prior tax refunds of
disproportionate assessment liabilities (for
illegal valuations on commercial properties)
.
3. Proceeds from the sale of four surplus garage
facilities owned by the City that are in excess of
debt service paid and outstanding on such
properties, estimated at $32 million.
Use of these one-time revenue sources is akin to
selling the "family jewels" in order to maintain a lifestyle
that current income cannot sustain.
The 1984 tax rate computation is also being balanced
without providing for the anticipated full cost during the
current fiscal year of collective bargaining salary and wage
increases for City, County and School employees currently
under negotiation and expected to require up to another $25
ii
million in appropriations.
For the 1985 fiscal year, the gap between estimated
operating revenues and expenditures will be about $48
million; for 1986, the projected gap will be about $34
million. In each of these years, however, the underlying
assumptions are that Boston will not incur net operating
deficits from prior years, that assessed valuations
generated by new construction will increase at the rate of
about $600 million per year and that the Commonwealth will
continue to fund local aid with increments of at least $160
million a year.
To avert prospective operating deficits in the near
term. City officials should resort to Self-Help options,
choices over which they have primary decision-making power,
while State-Help options, requiring legislative and
Gubernatorial initiatives can help resolve some of the
City's more systemic or structural fiscal problems, as
recommended below:
Self-Help
1. To prevent the balancing of a single year's tax rate at
the expense of subsequent tax rates, the incoming City
Administration should prepare and make public a
comprehensive and balanced financial plan for the 1984 to
1986 fiscal years updating the original estimates for fiscal
1984, to reflect changes necessary to cover any incipient
operating deficit, and calculating the expenditure and
revenue estimates for the 1985 and 1986 fiscal years on
realistic assumptions.
Expenditure estimates should include adequate
appropriations for employee benefits and court judgements
and claims, thereby ending past year practices of
under-appropriating the requirements for these items.
Estimates of local receipts should be based on actual
collections from these sources, except where the evidence
clearly supports any deviations from such prudent policy.
2. All or most of the personnel costs for collective
bargaining settlements affecting expenditure requirements
for both the 1984 and 1985 fiscal years should be financed
from savings generated from payroll reductions and from
unencumbered appropriation balances of prior years.
Personnel vacancies in non-critical positions should be
left unfilled and payroll attrition should be fostered by
adopting retirement incentives, productivity enhancement
mechanisms and alternative service delivery systems that
will help shrink the City's work force, reduce the cost and
improve the effectiveness of City services.
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3. The new City Administration should adopt firm policies
and schedules for retention and/or disposition of the $20
million in appropriation reserves so that this set-aside is
used for its essential purpose of averting potential
appropriation and/or revenue deficiencies.
4. Excess proceeds from the sale of City assets should no
longer be used as revenues for current operations, but
should go into a stabilization fund for financing such
capital outlays as automotive equipment and other equipment
with relatively rapid depreciation, sidewalk and street
reconstruction and deferred building maintenance and repair,
all of which are regularly recurring capital requirements,
thereby avoiding the high interest costs incurred for bond
issues
.
State-Help
1. The Legislature should authorize regionwide taxes to
replace local property tax financing of transit services
throughout the state, in all metropolitan areas including
the Boston area. (For Boston, this would relieve the
property tax levy of about $40 million a year.)
2. The Legislature should authorize the Commonwealth to
integrate county correctional institutions into the
statewide correctional system, at an estimated state cost of
V$40 million a year, providing about $14 million a year in
property tax relief to the City of Boston.
3. If the Legislature is willing to enact only part of the
above package of recommendations, it should substitute a
limited set of local excise tax options that any city or
town could adopt, options that would have minimum adverse
impact on local economies such as a parking excise tax and
dedication of the hotel/motel room occupancy tax to local
government.
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FOREWORD
"Boston's Fiscal Future: Prognosis and Policy Options
for 1984 to 1986" is the first product of the newly
established John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs.
The Institute is named for the Speaker of the United States
House of Representatives from 1962 to 1971. Born in South
Boston less than a mile from the University of Massachusetts
at Boston's Harbor Campus, John McCormack lived much of his
life in Dorchester, home of the Campus, and represented
Massachusetts' Ninth Congressional District in which the
campus lies for 43 years.
The McCormack Institute has several complementary
goals. Through applied research in public policy, the
Institute will marshall University resources to address the
needs of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. By instituting
a wide-ranging educational outreach program in cooperation
with the John F. Kennedy Library, the Institute will promote
informed debate and encourage active participation in public
life. By serving as home to the University's Master of
Science in Public Affairs, the Institute will recruit and
train leaders for both the public and private sectors.
The Institute builds upon resources already existing on
the Boston Campus. The Center for Survey Research, the
vii
Boston Urban Observatory, and the Policy Studies Center all
have proven, highly successful records in providing timely
analysis on public policy issues of concern to the
Commonwealth. The McCormack Institute is intended to draw
together, coordinate and expand these efforts. The
Institute will also join University resources with those of
its neighbors on Columbia Point, the John F. Kennedy
Memorial Library and the Massachusetts State Archives.
"Boston's Fiscal Future: Prognosis and Policy Options
for 1984 to 1986" is an example of the kind of product the
McCormack Institute will continue to make available to the
policy making community in Massachusetts.
Edmund Beard, Director
McCormack Institute
AUTHOP'S PREFACE
The authors are indebted to Robert A. Corrigan,
Chancellor of the University of Massachusetts at Boston, for
suggesting this critical area of policy analysis and for
providing the back-up required to complete our task.
Chancellor Corrigan had been an interested participant in
the Boston Workshop Series of 1982 - 1983, a collaborative
effort of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, Boston
Private Industry Council, Joint Center for Urban Studies of
M.I.T. and Harvard University and the Boston Neighborhood
Network, and had come away from its deliberations convinced
that an independently derived, reliable set of numbers and
alternative prescriptions for resolving the City's immediate
and near term fiscal dilemma would serve at least two useful
purposes: (1) Helping to focus campaign debates of this
year's municipal elections on salient issues of budget and
tax policy; (2) Helping the newly-elected Mayor and City
Council formulate comprehensive plans for coming to grips
with high-priority fiscal problems. We hope this paper will
achieve these goals.
Many friends read an early draft of this paper and made
helpful comments. We are especially thankful to Sam Tyler
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of the Boston Municipal Research Bureau for sharing with us
much of his data. The Bureau's continuing series of
reports on the City's finances was particularly invaluable.
Others to whom we are indebted are Newell Cook, Lowell
Richards, James Carris, Edmund Beard, John Avault, Larry
DiCara, Alex Ganz, James Young, Edward Collins, James
Vaneko, Richard Syron, Katherine Bradbury, Franklin
Patterson, and Robert Palmer.
Needless to say, the opinions, analysis and any errors
are solely the responsibility of the authors.
1BOSTON'S FISCAL FUTURE:
PROGNOSIS AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR
1984 to 1986
I. INTRODUCTION
The finances of the City of Boston have been variously
affected throughout its long history by regional and
national economic cycles, by legal constraints and changes
in the state-local tax system and by inter-municipal
resource and expenditure disparities.
In more recent years, however, a series of tremors
converged to propel Boston's seemingly chronic fiscal
problem to the crisis stage. As inflation climbed to
unprecedented double-digit levels, an overwhelming majority
of the state's populace supported specific limits on
property taxes, the primary source of municipal revenue. As
a result, Boston was forced to reduce property tax levies by
$144 million during the two year period, 1982-83. To
complicate matters federal assistance has been sharply
reduced from an annual peak of $133.5 million in fiscal 1981
to an estimated $71.6 million in fiscal 1983.
These factors followed a State court order in 1979 that
disproportionate assessments of commercial properties were
2unconstitutional, thereby generating a City obligation for
tax refunds that was originally calculated at over $140
million. To cover this extraordinary fiscal liability and
to cope with the initial cutbacks under the property tax
limits, the City went through a period of upheaval in fiscal
1982 until the Funding Loan Act of 1982 (the so-called
Tregor Bill) was passed. Passage of this bill provided for
the reemployment of many laid-off employees, particularly
police officers and fire fighters, and provided calmer
waters in fiscal 1983 for the City's ship.
As fiscal 1984 approached, the respite of 1983 was
short-lived and new storm clouds appeared on the horizon.
Would Boston face lay-offs and budget crises once again in
fiscal 1984 and in subsequent years?
The Administration that will take office in January,
1984 must contend with more than the above synopsis of
fiscal problems and compensating factors. Fiscal 1984
decisions, those already made and those to be made
throughout the remainder of 1984, will to a considerable
extent shape the spending and resource requirements of the
next two subsequent fiscal years. This report is designed,
therefore, to identify the key revenue and expenditure
variables for the fiscal years, 1984-86, projecting
3estimates for each major tax rate component on the basis of
clearly delineated assumptions, indicating the revenue
shortfalls for each year, and outlining available options
for closing the predicted expenditure-revenue gaps.
4II. THE MUNICIPAL EQUATION
Municipal government has become exceedingly complex.
Although municipal financial management has also grown in
complexity, one simple rule prevails: budgeted
appropriations must be limited to estimated revenues. This
maxim has been dubbed by some as the "Municipal Equation".
Moreover, a logical extension of this governing principle is
that unless actual expenditures are balanced by actual
receipts, the resulting operating deficit creates
deep-seated fiscal problems.
On the appropriations side of the Municipal Equation
are departmental operating and maintenance budgets, (City,
County, Health and Hospitals and School) , a schedule of
relatively fixed costs (debt service requirements, employee
retirement contributions, prior year appropriation and
revenue deficits and deficits for property tax refunds in
excess of established overlay reserves) and state
assessments for the municipal share of the MBTA operating
deficit and debt service. Metropolitan Parks District
expenditures, and miscellaneous assessments for a variety of
smaller state and metropolitan purposes.
The revenue side of the Municipal Equation includes
such major components as state aid distributions and
5reimbursements, local receipts (licenses, fines and service
charges) , federal revenue sharing allocations, in lieu tax
payments, interest earnings on temporary investments and
property tax revenues.
While the basic concept of the Municipal Equation has
remained largely unchanged, its internal workings have been
turned upside down with the enactment of Proposition 2 1/2.
Prior to Proposition 2 1/2, elected municipal officials
appropriated funds for all of the items on the expenditure
side of the equation. Thus they would establish the levels
of expenditures for the forthcoming year for police, fire,
school and other local operating and maintenance needs and
local assessors would add the fixed costs and state
assessments as enumerated by the State Department of Revenue
in the Cherry Sheets.
After totaling all estimated expenditures, local
officials balanced the equation with an equivalent amount of
anticipated revenue. The amount of money estimated from
local sources was based by law on prior year's actual
receipts while federal revenue sharing funds were
entitlement estimates of the U.S. Department of Treasury.
Once the amount of state aid was revealed in the Cherry
Sheet, municipal assessors figured the net amount that had
6to be raised from the property tax levy, the balancing
factor in the Municipal Equation. The major revenue
component—the property tax—was the last item to be
calculated by local assessors.
Proposition 2 1/2 terminated the open-ended budget
balancing mechanism historically available to local
decision-makers. The property tax levy is restricted by the
Proposition 2 1/2 law in annual amount and growth potential,
and local elected officials must, in effect, reverse the
procedure for balancing the Municipal Equation. The first
and most important question now is: How much revenue is
available for spending? If planned appropriations exceed
revenue, the equation must be bridged by reducing
expenditure requirements.
7III. BOSTON'S PROPERTY TAX REVENUES
Three-quarters of Boston's operating revenues are
derived from two sources: property taxes and state aid. In
fiscal 1984 we estimate that, if non-recurring revenues are
excluded from the calculation, Boston will receive 39% of
total operating revenues from the property tax and 36% from
state aid. This is in sharp contrast to fiscal 1981 (the
year prior to Proposition 2 1/2) when property taxes were
59% of total revenues and state aid was 23%. Obviously,
these major shifts in revenue proportions are due to the
impacts of Proposition 2 1/2 and the response of the
Commonwealth—an important theme which will receive further
analysis
.
Boston can expect property tax revenue to equal 2 1/2%
of its total assessments. The City's current building boom
provides the substance for additional tax growth which will
be important for financing some of the City's increasing
costs. Before analyzing all revenue sources in detail,
however, we need to understand more fully the relationships
among property taxes. Proposition 2 1/2 and economic growth.
8ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND BOSTON'S PROPERTY TAX LEVY
Over the three-year period since the enactment of
Proposition 2 1/2, the level of property taxation in Boston
has declined significantly. Estimates indicate that in
fiscal 1984, the City's effective tax rate will have been
cut by at least half—from 5.18% in fiscal 1981 to 2.5% in
fiscal 1984! Accompanying the overall reduction in property
tax burden is the dramatic decline in the portion of
property taxes paid by owners of residential property.
As shown in Table I, residential property now accounts
for 30% of property tax bills in Boston, down from 37.5%.
Owners of commercial, industrial and personal property
(mostly utilities) pay the remaining 70% of the City's
property taxes.
Table I: Boston's Tax Bill Shares:
Before & After Revaluation and Classification
PROPERTY CLASS BEFORE (1982) AFTER (1983)
Residential 37.5% 30.5%
Commercial 37.5 43.5
Industr ial 11.0 7.7
Personal 14.0 18.2
Source: Boston Assessing Department
9With business property responsible for $.70 of every
dollar of property taxes, the key fiscal issue to consider
is what will be the effects and benefits of current and
future economic development. To clarify this question, we
must first review the rules of Proposition 2 1/2.
The basic tenet of Proposition 2 1/2 is that the
overall level of taxation not exceed a 2 1/2% effective tax
rate. For fiscal 1983 Boston raised $374 million in taxes
on a property tax base certified at $12.2 billion by the
State Department of Revenue—an effective rate of 3%. To
comply with the 2 1/2% limitation in fiscal 1984, Boston
will either have to reduce the tax levy, raise the tax base
(i.e. assessments) or undertake some combination of both
alternatives. Below is a review of the options for 1984.
If the tax base could not be raised above $12.2
billion, the tax levy would have to be cut to $317.9
million, a reduction of $56.5 million. On the other hand, if
the tax base were increased to $14.96 billion, the levy
could remain unchanged at $374 million, yielding a 2 1/2%
effective tax rate. Most astute observers of the City's
development trends, while cognizant of the hot pace of new
and rehabilitated construction in Boston, doubt that the
City's valuations have grown by $2.76 billion in value in a
10
single yearl Hence, it is more realistic to estimate that in
fiscal 1984, the tax base will rise somewhat while the levy
will also fall somewhat.
City officials had stated their hope in early Spring of
achieving a tax base of $14 billion for fiscal 1984, If
this occurred, the levy could be $350 million, a decline of
only $24 million over the prior year. According to more
recent estimates contained in the City Official Statement
(p. 19), however, the property tax levy is expected to be
$330-345 million, figured on a tax base of $13.2-13.8
billion.
Tax base/tax levy alternatives for Fy84 are presented
in Table II.
Table II: Tax Base/Levy Alternatives: City of Boston
1984 Fiscal Year
TAX BASE LEVY
$15 billion $374 million
14 billion 350 million
13.5 billion 337.5 million
13.0 billion 325 million
12.5 billion 312.5 million
11
The arithmetic in Table II is obvious: the higher the
tax base for 1984, the less the loss in property tax
revenues
!
MARKET VALUES FOR FISCAL 1984
For fiscal 1984 the City Assessor is planning to
increase the valuations of most existing properties to
maintain parity with market appreciation. In addition to
such an increase in the general tax base, the Assessor can
also add valuations for new construction to the tax base.
Although we do not have available the figures presently
being reviewed by the Assessing Department, we were able to
collect and analyze data useful for projecting the City's
tax base for each of the next three years.
NEW CONSTRUCTION
The Boston Redevelopment Authority maintains a
cumulative record of all new construction and rehabilitation
being undertaken in the City. This file is maintained by
year of completion and by type of use. Its data includes an
estimate of the construction costs of the projects. We
reviewed this listing to identify all taxable new
construction by commercial or residential use and by year of
completion. We also adjusted the construction cost data
12
upward by a factor o£ 1.66 on the assumption that
construction costs were only 60 percent of market value.
Table III: Market Value of Property by Class and
Year of Completion
(x$1000)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Total $345,186 $398,607 $1,137,002 $80,982 $275,261
Business 290,755 352,791 1,048,813 31,390 248,701
Residential 54,431 45,816 88,189 49,592 26,560
According to the estimates in Table III, $345 million
of market value construction and rehabilitation was
completed in calendar 1982; $398 million will have been
completed in 1983 and $1.1 billion in 1984, with
subsantially lower amounts in the two subsequent years.
While these figures represent projects completed in the
calendar year cited, for property tax purposes it is
perfectly legal and expected that during the construction
period, partial assessments will be recorded on the tax
rolls. For example, the three largest projects currently
underway in Boston are Copley Place, Dewey Square, and 53
Exchange. BRA calculations indicate that both Dewey Square
and 53 Exchange are planned for completion in 1984. As for
13
Copley Place it is expected that 29% of the project (in
terms of value) will be completed in 1983 and the balance in
1984.
Table IV shows the current assessment (1983) on each of
these projects and our estimate of market value as of the
completion dates.
Table IV: Current AssessiDents and Market Value Estimates
for Selected Developments,
City of Boston
Fiscal 1983 AssessmentCx$1000)
Total Market
Value
(x$1000)
Copley Place
Land/ftlr rights
Westin Hotel
Marriott Hotel
$^82,638
$No Value
5,308
Total
31.333
Dewey Square
Land
Building
190,126
$10,120
No ^alue
Total 110,120
53 Exchange
Land
Building
178,i450
Total
$11,233
$12 ilBl
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According to Table IV, all three developments reflect
some assessed values for fiscal 1983, but these are only a
small fraction of the market value upon completion. In
fiscal 1984, the City will be able to increase the
assessments on all three projects by substantial amounts.
The key question, of course, is by how much the City can
increase assessments on these projects as well as on other
new construction and on the existing tax base.
15
THE FISCAL 1984 TAX BASE
The answer to the above question is difficult until all
applicable data are compiled. However, we think a
reasonable estimate of market value for 1984 is $13.4
billion. This estimate assumes the City will increase the
current tax base by 5%, on average, and that $632.6 million
in new construction assessments will be added to the tax
rolls. The data are presented in Table V. A tax base of
$13.4 billion will allow the City to raise a levy of $335.5
billion in fiscal 1984, and will bring the City's effective
tax rate to the 2 1/2% limit.*
THE FISCAL 1985 TAX BASE
Beginning with fiscal 1985, the City will be under the
2 1/2% levy cap provisions of Proposition 2 1/2. Under this
limitation the tax levy increase on the existing tax base
(as opposed to new construction) is restricted to 2 1/2% per
year. Thus, we would expect the fiscal 1984 levy of $335.5
million to rise by 2.5% in fiscal 1985, reflecting the
increase of a similar 2.5% in the existing tax base. This
higher levy supplemented by assessments based on new
construction will bring the fiscal 1985 tax base to $14.4
billion, thereby generating a tax levy for that year of
$359.2 million.
*In establishing the 1984 tax rate, Boston's Assessing
Department increased total valuations to $13.3 billion; the
property tax levy was $333.3 million. Our conclusion was
that the closeness of the City's final figures and our
estimates validated the approach for 1985 and 1986.
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With a new administration entering City Hall in 1984,
and given our knowledge of the management and systemic
problems in the Assessing Department, we assume that for
fiscal 1985 the City will not adjust the base assessments,
and add only valuations for new construction.
Table V: Tax Levy and Tax Base: Fiscal 1984-86
City of Boston
FISCAL INITIAL NEW TOTAL TAX EFFECTIVE
YEAR TAX BASE CONSTRUCTION TAX BASE LEVY TAX RATE
1983 $12. 177b $ $12. 177b $374. 6m 3.07%
1984 12.786 632.6m 13.331* 333.3* 2.5
1985 13.754 613.6 14.367 359.2 2.5
1986 15.085 601.1 15.687 385.4 2.467
THE FISCAL 1986 TAX BASE
In fiscal 1986 we assume that the Assessing Department
will be able to increase the existing tax base by at least
5%. This estimated increase added to the expected volume of
new construction will bring the tax base to $15.7 billion
and will allow the City to adopt a tax levy for 1986 of
$385.4 million.**
Notably, beginning in fiscal 1986, the average
effective tax rate in the City is expected to fall below
official figures of Boston Assessing Department.
** According to the calculation for 1986, the tax Increnent for new construc-
tion will be based on the classified tax rate times the value of. conmercfal
or residential property. We assume from our figures In Table V that 9051
of the value of the new construction will be ooimerclal. We further
assure that the classified tax rate for ccnrerclal property for 1985 will
be $32.00. To those Interested, the authors will explain the calculations-
17
2.5%. This reflects the relative lag in the growth of the
tax levy in contrast to the faster growing existing tax
base. If there are no changes in the laws of Proposition
2 1/2, or if no local referenda allowing accelerated levy
growth are approved, the effective tax rate in Boston will
begin a long and gradual decline in fiscal 1986.
18
IV ESTIMATED REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
This section presents the key numbers and assumptions
underlying our pronostications on both the revenue and
expenditure side; the next section presents the analysis.
(The details are presented in Table VI.) For fiscal 1981 to
1983, actual estimates are employed while for fiscal years
1984 to 1986 projected estimates are employed.
THE REVENUE SUMMARY
1. Tax Levy
For fiscal 1984 the property tax levy estimate of
$333.3 million is based on the assumption that the City's
value of real and personal property will show an increase
over the prior year of $1,241 billion because of market
appreciation and new growth in offices, hotels and
condominiums, bringing Boston's total value to $13,331
billion. It is further estimated that tax base growth will
continue into 1985 ($14,367 billion) and 1986 ($15,687
billion), yielding $359.2 million and $385.4 million in
property taxes, respectively.
2. State Aid
Governor Dukakis is committed to sharing 40% of the
annual growth in broad based taxes with the state's
municipalities. We assume that state taxes will increase by
19
Table VI Estimated Operating Revenues and Expenditures
City of Boston
FY 1981-1986
(in millions of dollars)
Ac tua 1 E s tima te Projected Estimate
Estimated Revenues 1981 1982 19 83* 1984 1985 1_986
Property Tax Levy $519 $441 $374. 6 $333 .3 $359 .2 $385. 4
200 224 97 R 302 7 333 1 363 5
Federal Rev. Sharing 22 22 X o . Q 19 . 19 .0 19. 2
Motor Vehicle Excise 15 5 7 R..J 7 .5 8 .0 8. 5
Fire Service Fee — — — — -
Parking Fines 7 14 25. 27 . 5 28 .6 29. 7
H D 57. 9 J D r»> u ^ 7 9
Hospital Receipts 75 87 96. 5 107 . 5 115. 123.
9 4 n ni u > u c nu
TOTAL $878 $838 <5 R P 99 o o Z , cD $857. 5 $925. 1 $993. 8
Estimated Expenditures
City Departments $269 $194. $293. $296. 4 $325. 9 $342 . 2
1 AJ. 1 X X J 17. 1 7X / a po 1 Q 9 n
Health & Hosp. Dept. 91 92. 109. 108. 1 119. 3 125. 3
7^ 1^ X / ^ X u
«
J 9 9 Rz z o . r\u 9 9 Q 71 9 4 9 D 9 y1
_^ J 4 .
-7
_/
Sub-TOTAL 519 507. 8 647 $652. $701. ?742. 4
Contributory Pensions 76 83. 4 84. 102 .5 112 .7 124.
Debt Service 90 85. 1 74. 5 77. 76, 31. 5
Jri lUi — i^ai UeXlCXUS £• D J X . cJ 42
.
"5 7J / . U
Tax Title 1 1. 2 2. 1 .0 1 .0 1.
Overlay Deficit 23 55. 2 2. 5. 8 .0 8.
Current Overlay
_25
__19^ __18_.8 __2 0_.1 21. 2
Sub-TOTAL 240 280. 4 223. 5 $241. 3 $222 . 8 $240 . 7
MBTA Assessment 41 43. 5 39. 8 40 . 8 41 .8 42. 8
MDC Parks Assessment 4 4. 2 4. 7 4 . 3 4 . 4 4. 5
Misc. State Assess. 2 2. 1 2. 5 2..4 2 5 2. 6
Sub-TOTAL 47 49. 8 47. 47 5 48 .7 49. 9
TOTAL $878 $838. $917. 5 $940. 8 $973 . 5 $1028.
Revision of figures originally included in proforma Tax Rate
Recapatulation Form submitted to State Department of Revenue, 6/3/83.
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about $400 million a year, providing $160 million each year
for the cities and towns. We further assume that Boston
will continue to receive about 19% of total state aid.
However, it should be recognized that this assumption will
require new local aid formulas recognizing Boston's unique
position among all cities and towns. Boston's share of the
lottery formula is 13% and its share of Chapter 70
distributions is 11%. If state aid formulas are not revised
and Boston's proportion of state aid is reduced to 13% of
the statewide total, state aid for 1985 and 1986 would be
lower by $9 to $10 million each year.
3. Federal Revenue Sharing
Federal revenue sharing allocations to Boston have been
slightly reduced since 1982 because of the City's population
decline. We expect the annual distribution over the next
three years to remain relatively flat.
4. Motor Vehicle Excise Tax
The City will experience some growth in this revenue
source as new motor vehicles replace older vehicles garaged
in Boston. We are projecting a modest increase of half a
million dollars per year in 1985 and 1986.
5, Parking Fines
With the introduction of the Parking Violations Bureau
»21
and more aggressive enforcement of parking ticket
collections, the City has increased its yield from parking
fines by four-fold. We estimate less explosive future
growth of this revenue source at 4% per year.
6. Departmental Receipts
We estimate an annual increase of 4% in these revenues
during the 1985-86 period.
7. Health and Hospital Receipts
Since hospital receipts are established by the State's
Rate Setting Commission, prior actual receipts for 1983 are
used as the basis for the 1984 estimate and the 1985 and
1986 projections reflect average annual increases of 7% over
the prior year, in view of new reimbursement formulas under
cost containment legislation.
8. Available Funds
These are funds available from unspent departmental
appropriations (so-called unencumbered balances) of prior
years and from unallocated balances of prior years in fixed
cost items, such as the overlay deficit account or debt
service. For example. Table VI shows that $24 million in
"other available funds" was used as an estimated revenue for
fiscal 1983. Most of this was an accumulation of
unencumbered appropriation balances for 1982 and prior
22
fiscal years. As of August 30, 1983, these balances had
reached $25.7 million as a result of cancellation of
unneeded reserves compared with a negative appropriation
balance of $8.5 million as of June 23rd when unliquidated
reserved for encumbrances totaled $48.8 million. Since the
City Auditor tightened up policies on establishing
encumbrance reserves for carry-over of 1983 appropriations
into 1984 and a more effective encumbrance system is likely
to be maintained, we anticipate far lower accumulations of
unencumbered appropriation balances in 1984-86 estimated at
$5 million a year.
THE EXPENDITURE SUMMARY
Table VI presents the detail for the major items of
Boston's estimated expenditures in each fiscal year,
1981-86. Below is a summary of anticipated trends over the
next three years with emphasis on the assumptions underlying
the projections.
1. Departmental Operation/Maintenance
(City, County, Health and Hospitals, School)
Appropriations for departmental operation and
maintenance in fiscal 1984 are expected to total $652
million, an increase of only seven-tenths of one percent
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over total appropriations for the prior year.
The 1984 figures for City, County and Health and
Hospital Departments include appropriations already enacted
and approved supplementary appropriations. However, the
1984 estimates do not cover the cost of salary increases
likely to be negotiated over the next few months under
collective bargaining agreements with the several unions
representing City, County and School Department employees.
In calculating the estimates for fiscal 1985, the 1984
figures were adjusted to include the anticipated annualized
cost of collective bargaining salary increases negotiated in
the prior fiscal year and to further increase these modified
numbers by 5%. The 5% adjustment is based on the projected
impact on departmental appropriations of an estimated index
for government purchases of goods and services. For fiscal
1986 the prior year appropriation estimates also reflect
increases of 5%.
2. Contributory Pensions
The City's requirements for contributory pensions in
fiscal 1984 will increase by about 22% over the prior year,
but this was due to deferral of a 10% increase in fiscal
1983 over the prior year at the request of state officials.
Thus we estimate that for fiscal 1985 and 1986, contributory
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pension costs will grow by an average of 10% per year.
3. Debt Service
The projected estimates for debt service are based on
the following assumptions: (a) the $30 million bond issue of
September 1, 1983 at an average net interest cost of 10%;
(b) an anticipated bond issue of $30 million in the Spring
of 1984 at an average net interest cost of 10%; (c) an
anticipated bond issue of $60 million in the Spring of 1985
at an average net interest cost of 9%; and (d) higher
interest charges on tax anticipation notes in 1984, which
will decline to $3 million in each of the next two fiscal
years
.
4. Prior Year Deficits
Revised figures on prior year deficits to be raised in
the 1984 tax rate— for departmental spending in excess of
appropriations, operating revenue shortfalls and overlay
deficits covering property tax refunds in excess of
available overlay reserves—are now estimated at $37
million. Calculation of this net deficiency includes $16.3
million for appropriation deficits (expenditures and
encumbrances in excess of appropriations) and $37.3 million
for revenue deficits (expenditures in excess of actual
revenues). However, the overall deficiency of $53.6 million
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in revenues and avaiable funds over expenditures and
encumbrances is partially offset by the allocation of
unencumbered appropriation balances of prior years, thereby
reducing the net operating deficit to be raised in fiscal
1984 to $37 million.
For fiscal 1985 and 1986, however, our assumption is
that the financial mechanisms inaugurated under the Tregor
legislation will have been institutionalized, that more
effective internal controls will have been installed in
accordance with recommendations of the City's independent
auditors, thereby ending the cycle of appropriation
deficits. In addition we assume that revenue estimates will
be realistic and in accordance with statutory requirements,
thereby averting future revenue deficits. Thus the deficit
estimates for 1984-86 include only overlay deficits,
estimated at $5 million for 1984 and $8 million for 1985 and
1986, reflecting anticipated large abatements on appeal from
public utility assessments and the higher proportion of the
overlay absorbed by so-called clause exemptions for
abatenients to certain classes of taxpayers (elderly, widows,
veterans and indigent). With completion of the revaluation
establishing realistic assessments and provisions of the
Funding Loan Act designed to reduce the accumulation of
26
overlay deficits due to disproportionate assessments of
commercial property, our assumption is that overlay deficits
will not be a significant issue in the next three fiscal
years.
5. State Assessments
Since Proposition 2 1/2 limits the annual increase in
state assessments to 2 1/2% of the prior year's assessment,
this was used as the guideline for estimating MBTA, MDC
Parks and miscellaneous state assessments in fiscal 1985 and
1986. Assessments for fiscal 1984 were specified in this
year's Cherry Sheet from the State Department of Revenue.
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V BOSTON'S MISMATCH BETWEEN EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES
Our summary calculations for Boston's estimated
expenditures are reproduced in Table VII along with our
operating revenue estimates for each of the next three
fiscal years. For fiscal 1984, a potential operating gap of
$83 million is averted through the extensive use of one
time, non-recurring revenues and unused funds in the 1982
overlay deficit account for achieving tax rate balance and
for reducing the prior year deficit to be raised in 1984.
However, the 1984 figures exclude the cost of negotiated
collective bargaining increases that could exceed $25
million on an annualized basis. For the 1985 fiscal year
the gap between operating revenues and expenditures is
estimated at about $48 million; for fiscal 1986, the
projected gap will be about $34 million.
For fiscal 1985 and 1986, our figures assume that
Boston will not incur similar prior-year deficits that must
be raised in these years. If the next Administration fails
to curb, and finally end, prospective overruns of
appropriations and shortfalls of revenues, however, a fiscal
1984 deficit will occur that will have to be raised in
fiscal 1985, thereby exacerbating the operating gap
projection
.
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Table VII Estimates of Potential Operating Gaps
1984 to 1986
(in millions)
Fiscal__^4 Fiscal__^85^ !'iscal_J^6
To be raised
(Estimated Appro-
priations) $941 $973 $1,028
Estimated Operating
Revenues 858 925 994
Potential Operating
Gap 83 48 34
Non- Recurring Revenues:
Tregor Reimbursements 17
DAF Surplus 34
Sale of Assets 32
Deficit — 48 34
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Although sizable annual operating gaps loom on the
horizon for fiscal 1985 and 1986, the prospects for covering
the potential deficit in 1984 are quite favorable.
Available to the City are several non-recurring sources of
revenue: 1) the surplus in the Disproportionate Assessment
Fund, 2) reimbursement of the City's General Fund for tax
refunds in disproportionate assessment cases that could be
legally charged to the Funding Loan, and 3) excess proceeds
from the sale of City assets. Funds from these sources are
adequate to cover the incipient operating gap for 1984 if
the salary increases anticipated from collective bargaining
negotiations are excluded. However, use of these one-time
revenue sources are akin to selling the "family jewels" in
order to maintain a lifestyle that current income cannot
sustain. At some point in time the day of reckoning will
arrive and prospective expenditure-revenue gaps can no
longer be filled by "one shot" revenue devices.
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NON-RECURRING REVENUES
1. Disproportionate Assessment Fund
The Disproportionate Assessment Fund (DAF) was
established by the City in accordance with provisions of the
1982 Funding Loan Act. This authorized Boston to borrow up
to $45 million to finance a portion of the City's so-called
"Tregor" liability. This liability arose from a decision of
the State Supreme Court in "Tregor vs. Assessors of Boston"
(1979) which held that the City's assessing practices had
led to disproportionate assessments on certain properties,
principally commercial properties, thereby violating state
constitutional standards. Proceeds from the bond sale,
supplemented by proceeds from the sale of Hynes Veterans
Auditorium (convention facility) to the Massachusetts
Convention Center Authority, were deposited in this Fund.
As of June 30, 1983, any unexpended balances in the Fund
after the City's General Fund had been reimbursed for prior
payments of disproportionate assessment liabilities were
available for use by the City without appropriation for debt
service payments in the next fiscal year under the Funding
Loan and for debt service on any other City incurred debt in
such year. The Disproportionate Assessment Board has
determined that the surplus in the Fund is $34 million.
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2. Tregor Reimbursements
City officials currently estimate that aggregate
disbursements for Tregor liabilities will total $95 million
for the five years ending with fiscal 1984. (City Official
Statement, P. 20) This compares with an original estimate
of tax abatement liability recorded as of June 30, 1982 at
$143.4 million.
Reimbursements of the City's General Fund from Tregor
loan proceeds, estimated at $17 million, are designed to
recover 1980-81 school deficits caused by court mandated
payment of executed collective bargaining agreements and
raised in the fiscal 1982 property tax levy. Funds
available for Tregor reimbursements are in the form of
unallocated balances in the overlay deficit account
established in the 1982 tax rate that was originally $55.2
million. In effect, therefore, most of the Funding Loan
bond issue is being used in 1984 to cover prior-year
operating deficits, reflecting a one-time practice of
borrowing to meet current expenses.
3. Sale of Assets
Other provisions of the Funding Act of 1982 liberalized
existing law governing the disposal of surplus City
property, including off-street parking structures owned by
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the City, and the use of the proceeds from such disposition.
Funds from such sales are to be deposited in the Surplus
Property Disposition Fund and are available to:
a. Cover all debt and interest paid and
outstanding on such property, and
b. Be credited to the City's General Fund
for all proceeds in excess of such debt service on
the sold property.
These excess amounts are "to be used only to service
the cost of debt as it becomes due", the practical effect of
which is to make such funds available for operating
purposes
.
The City has begun proceedings to dispose of four
municipal garages—Fort Hill Square, St. James Avenue, Kilby
Street, and Government Center. It is expected that the
revenues derived from the sale of these four parcels will
range from a total of $36.9 million to $59 million. "The
amounts may vary given the final approved development
programs and final offers to the City." (BRA, P. 11). The
Mayor recently announced approval of a sales price of $20.5
million for the development proposal for the Government
Center garage.
The first claim on these proceeds is the $17,5 million
in incurred and outstanding debt service on these garages,
which must be allocated under existing law to capital
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improvements. This leaves a balance of $19.4 million to
$41.5 million available for credit to the City's General
Fund for debt service reduction. However, the Mayor has
announced plans to allocate $15-34 million for an addition
and rehabilitation of the two Latin High schools and "a
minimum of $5 million will be dedicated to the Boston
Housing Development Trust." (BRA, P.ll) . If the Mayor did
not allocate funds to these two capital purposes, between
$19.4 million and $41.5 million would be available for
bridging the potential 1984 deficit. (This assumes, of
course, that the proceeds from the "garage sale" will be
fully available as estimated revenues in fiscal 1984.) The
Mayor has tentatively decided to allocate between $15
million and $20 million to operating purposes (debt service
reduction) for fiscal 1984 as compared with double the
amount authorized by law.
One alternative that the Mayor might consider is to
borrow funds for the Latin schools instead of using the
proceeds from the sale of garages. The debt service would
be eligible for state reimbursement ranging between 75% and
90% and free up the funds from the assets sales for other
purposes. (On Septeniber 28th, the City Council gave initial
authorization for a $35 million bond issue for Latin High
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Schools addition and renovation.)
The City will be able to reallocate to operating
purposes, as it sees fit, an accumulation of so called
unencumbered appropriation balances from 1982 and prior
fiscal years, currently estimated at over $25 million. Most
of this will likely be used to reduce the fiscal 1983
operating deficiency, the remainder going to 1983 deferred
wage increases under collective bargaining arrangements with
the Boston Police Patrolman's Association.
4. Fiscal 1985 and 1986 Deficits
The relative dimensions of the operating gaps for
fiscal 1985 and 1986 are predicated on three important
assumptions. If any of these assumptions do not prevail,
the size of the operating deficit in each year could
increase considerably.
First, we assume the City will maintain the kind of
fiscal management discipline in 1984 and 1985 that will
require agencies to spend within the limits of appropriated
amounts and financial officers to adopt realistic revenue
estimates
.
Second, we assume that economic development and the
derived assessed valuations will grow at the rate of about
$600 million per year.
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Third, we assume that the state will continue to fund
additional local aid at least at the $160 million annual
level. There are some rumblings that such continued
expansion of local aid will not be acceptable to legislators
next year in the face of competing demands for available
resources. On the other hand, a recovering economy may
increase state tax collections beyond original expectations.
This issue bears constant attention.
Even if the points of optimism are correct, the City
still faces annual operating gaps in the range of $34-48
million. How can these deficits be avoided? The choices
are budget cuts and increased efficiencies, service
eliminations and/or transfers to the state, and/or new
revenue sources. In the next section we review the menu of
options.
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VI MENU OF OPTIONS
The menu of options available to City officials can be
divided into two categories. First, there are options over
which elected City officials have primary control, which we
categorize as Self-Help options. Second, there are options
which require legislative and Gubernatorial initiatives
and/or approvals, which can be categorized as State-Help
options
.
Most of the Self-Help options can be used in the near
term to avert operating deficits. Except for cutting
services and expenditures, however, these options do not
address the systemic or structural problems that result in
annual gaps between steady state revenues and appropriations
for the City of Boston. More importantly, each of the
Self-Help options are one- time choices v/bich will, once
executed, not be available for recurring use.
On the other hand, State-Help options will respond to
the built-in, longer range fiscal problems of the City.
These alternatives can provide growth oriented revenue
sources which not only wil] assist in easing the potential
operating deficit problems of future years, but also have
enough elasticity to make revenue margins available for
future program needs.
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SELF-HELP OPTIONS
As previously indicated the City has a number of
options available to it to assure that there will not be a
gap in fiscal 1984. In addition, these options could help
close to some degree the projected deficits for fiscal 1985
and 1986.
FISCAL 1984
Our above analysis of expenditures and revenues for
fiscal 1984 included an allusion to one-time revenue sources
available to the City for closing the expenditure gap.
There are several items, however, which bear special
scrutiny—collective bargaining and appropriation reserves.
How these items are handled will not only effect the overall
expenditure level of the City for 1984, but could drive the
1984 budget into an operating deficit unless all
appropriations and expenditure requirements, including
collective bargaining increases, are adequately provided for
from existing and available revenue sources, as required by
the State Department of Revenue in the Agreement signed by
City officials on June 13, 1983.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
About 85% of the City's non-school employees are
organized, union employees being represented by 13 different
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unions. Negotiations are under way with the larger of these
unions and the final settlements will impact on fiscal 1984
expenditures
.
In addition, the School Committee is, at this writing,
in negotiations for a contract retroactive to September 1,
1983 with teaching and supervisory employee groups. Suffolk
County employees are negotiating wage levels for the period
commencing July 1, 1983.
The outcome of these negotiations will effect the level
of expenditures in fiscal 1984 and subsequent years. Our
1984 estimates provided no provision for collective
bargaining increases. Some estimates of collective
bargaining costs for fiscal 1984 run as high as $25 million.
This sum can be met either by raising new revenues, by
running a deficit in fiscal 1984 or by funding wage
increases with staff reductions.
APPROPRIATION RESERVES
In order to provide a cushion against a possible budget
deficit for fiscal 1984, the City's budget agency has placed
$20 million in a special category called appropriation
reserves. Although already appropriated, these funds are
to be held in reserve until such time as it is clear to City
budget officials that no fiscal 1984 deficit will occur. How
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the current Administration and the new Administration
administer this reserve will effect the final 1984 numbers.
We have included this sum in our appropriation numbers
above.
FIRE SERVICES FEE
The 1982 Funding Loan Act authorized the City to charge
a fire service fee on certain buildings "which place special
burdens on the City's fire protection services". This law
was implemented in fiscal 1983, but the City was enjoined
from collecting the fee by order of the Superior Court on
the grounds that the fee is a tax which is not
proportionately assessed and is therefore unconstitutional.
(Emerson College vs. City of Boston) . The matter is now
before the Supreme Judicial Court. The City's position is
that if it prevails on appeal, it can collect fees for
fiscal 1983 as well as for 1984—a total of $16 million.
There are some observers who believe that the revised
Home Rule petition authorizing an augmented Fire Services
Fee still has statutory defects. Thus it is unlikely that
the City will prevail in this case. Hence we have not
included this revenue estimate in our calculations.
FISCAL 1985 AND 1986
In fiscal 1985 and 1986 the City has a number of
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Self-Kelp options it can employ to reduce the
spending-revenue gap identified above. First, it can cut
appropriations and services. Second, it can continue to
declare surplus and sell available capital assets to plug
the revenue gap.
BUDGET CUTS
There are areas in Boston's budget where expenditures
can be cut with little or no lost of services. A study by
Bradbury and Yinger (1983) estimates that productivity
increases of 1-2% could be squeezed out of the Boston
budget, yielding $5-10 million annually. In addition,
first-hand experience in City Hall coroborates that in one
department there is over $2 million in excess spending.
It should be noted, however, that personnel cuts in
Boston City Hall will not, by themselves, wipe out the
budget gaps we identified above. For instance, if we assume
that the average salary in Boston is $17,000, a reduction of
1000 personnel would save the City $17 million annually,
which would cover only one-third of the estimated gap for
1985.
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SALE OF ASSETS
In fiscal 1984, the City is planning to sell four
City-owned parking garages for an aggregate sum of $39-59
million. Proceeds from the sale will be applied to debt
service paid and payable on these facilities, to some new
capital projects and to current operations for fiscal 1984.
The City presently estimates that $15-20 million will be
available for operations in fiscal 1984.
There are other assets which the City can sell in
fiscal 1985 or 1986 to help close the potential revenue gaps
for these years. We do not advocate selling these "family
jewels" to pay for current operations (more on this in the
recommendation section below). However, a Mayor and/or
Council faced with revenue shortfalls of the magnitude shown
above may well choose to resort to such sales to fund basic
services
.
For example, there are three garages in addition to
those put up for sale identify that could be sold in future
years—the Bedford-Kingston, Post Office Square, and
Winthrop Square garages. Table IX presents our estimates of
the gross sale value of these garages based on the
assumption of $10,000 per space or about $28 mil] ion, for a
net yield to the City of over $22 million. If the values of
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air rights and development options are substituted as
criteria of value, the aggregate proceeds from the sale of
these garage facilities could exceed $50 million, for a net
to the City of almost $45 million. (The difference between
gross and net is the debt service incurred by the City for
these facilities, which sums must be used for capital
outlays.
)
Table IX
Estimated Value of Assets Sale
SPACES VALUE
Bedford-Kingston 735 $ 7.350 million
Post Office Square 950 9.500 million
Winthrop Square 1125 11.250 million
TOTAL $28.1 million
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STATE-HELP OPTIONS
Cities and towns of Massachusetts are municipal
corporations established by mandate of the State of
Massachusetts, and most of the fiscal rules and guidelines
applicable to them are promulgated and/or sanctioned by
legislative and executive action. For example, the state
Constitution gives the power to tax only to the Legislature,
which has delegated to cities and towns only the power to
tax property.
When one looks at the options for state action to
assist Boston, as well as other cities and towns, there are
two general categories of options. The first is direct
financial aid, either by sending more local aid dollars back
to the cities and towns and/or by absorbing some current
costs of services now paid for by localities. The second
category, which has particular application to Boston, is to
enact enabling legislation which would allow a municipality
to levy some local taxes. We will address these two
categories in turn.
STATE COST ABSORPTION
There are a number of items that are now wholly or in
part the responsibility of the City of Boston and other
communities that could, based on sound economic, financial
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and equity principles, be paid for and/or administered by
the State. Those that leap to mind are 1.) cost of the
MBTA, 2.) penal costs associated with the county court
system, 3.) costs associated with the state-city pension
system.
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1, MBTA Costs
Boston comprises less than 20% of the metropolitan area
population, but pays 42% of the local government share of
the MBTA's deficit. The MBTA is a regional transit
authority that should be financed regionally, either
directly through levies of regionwide taxes other than
property, or indirectly by the State from broad-based State
taxes. Heavy reliance on the beleaguered property tax in
the past to support transit services in metropolitan Boston
has been a prime factor in chronic under-financing of the
maintenance and modernization of the system. Moreover, the
"fairness" of the formula imposing mandatory assessments
against local property taxes for metropolitan transit has
been a long-standing issue that has exacerbated local
reluctance to pay for costs controlled by a relatively
independent decision-making body, while pitting one
municipality against another.
The entire state benefits from the existence of the
MBTA, which is a key factor in the functioning of the Boston
area economy, an economy which generates more than half of
the Commonwealth's revenue. The whole state depends heavily
on the economic well-being of the Boston metropolitan area,
and by financing transit services, would only be subsidizing
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itself
.
In fiscal 1984, the cost to the City for its share of
the MBTA deficit is $41 million. If the State were to
assume this cost for Boston and other cities and towns that
are members of the MBTA district, the projected annual gaps
in City revenues would close by at least $41 million.
2. County Correctional Costs
When the state assumed responsibility for the
administration and financing of county court costs in 1979,
the take-over legislation did not include the correctional
institutions operated by counties under general supervision
of the State Department of Corrections. Boston still pays
for the total costs of the Charles Street Jail and the House
of Corrections on Deer Island. It is estimated that these
costs will amount to about $14 million in fiscal 1984
including employee benefits, retirement benefits and
anticipated settlements under collective bargaining.
Arguments for shifting the administration and financing of
county correctional facilities to the State may be grouped
into two categories: 1.) fiscal, 2.) quality of services.
Although county correctional institutions are supported
by municipal property taxes, many inn.ates in such
institutions are not county residents who committed their
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crimes within their own county jurisdiction. Moreover,
there are wide variations in wealth among counties which
generate disparities in the quality of correctional
services— in the adequacy of living facilities, in the
separation of inmates by severity of crimes and in the
availability and level of rehabilitative activities.
Transfer of county correctional services and costs would
provide property tax relief and facilitate development of a
unified, statewide system incorporating up-to-date and
cost-effective correctional treatment.
3. The Pension System
Boston participate£; in the State-Boston retirement
system which provides pension benefits to retired City
employees under a state-supervised retirement arrangement.
State legislation prescribes the formulas for computjr'g
retirement allowances, and periodic enactments of
legislation have supplemented such allowances with
cost-of-living increases. Pecent and future cost-of-living
adjustments, however, are the financial obligations of the
Commonwealth because of the passage of Proposition 2 1/2.
The City pays foi its cost of pension liabilities on a
pay-as-you-go basis mandated by statute. The annual cost of
contributory pensions is established by the State Division
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of Insurance and is a legal obligation of the City that must
be included in the tax levy. The City is reimbursed
annually by the State for that portion of the annual pension
contribution paid in the prior year to retired teachers.
While there is continuing concern over the net unfunded
actuarial liability of over $1.2 billion, the more immediate
significance of this issue is in its rate of growth. In
1979, the total contributory pension contribution of the
City was $61.4 million, of which $16.3 million was
reimbursed by the Commonwealth, for a net City outlay of
$45.1 million.
In fiscal 1983, the total contribution was $95.1
million and the City's net contribution was $75.8 million.
Over the five-year period, 1979-83, the City's total
contribution has risen by 55%, the net contribution by 68%.
Some observers have predicted that future growth rates will
accelerate and that this tax rate item has become a fiscal
"time-bomb"
.
It is certainly beyond the resources of the
Commonwealth to absorb the pension costs of Boston and all
other cities and towns. It would make sense, however, for
the Comnionweal th to begin reimbursing cities and towns for
the incremental cost of local pension contributions, thereby
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Stabilizing the ennual municipal outlay for this mandated
expense. Such a program could save Boston over $10 million
in fiscal 1985 and over $20 million in fiscal 1986. The
precec ent for State reimbursement of incremental pension
costs has been long established in the Commonwealth's
reimbursement for teacher pensions.
It should be noted that the current State policy of
reimbursing cities and towns for the costs of teacher
pensions probably discriminates against less affluent
municipalities in Massachusetts in favor of communities with
relatively higher per capita, family or household incomes.
School teachers in Boston account for one-third of a]} City
employees in Boston and only an estimated 20% of the City's
pension liabilities are teacher-related. In the richer
towns by contrast, over one-half of municipal eriployees ate
likely to be teachers, and teacher pension liabilities
constitute a niuch higher proportion that Boston's 20%.
4. State Aid
It has been a recurririg claim of City policymakers that
Boston deserves and needs additional amounts of State aid.
In the last three fif.cal years. State aid to Boston has
increesed by $110 mi] J ion theieby compensating for 6]% of
ti;e City'sloss of property taxes under Proposition 2 1/2.
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State aid as a percentage of total state appropriations
has risen significantly since the passage of Proposition 2
1/2, from 25% to 30%. In addition, Governor Dukakis has
conunitted his administration to share 40% of state revenue
growth with the cities and towns. With State revenues
increasing annually in the $400 to $500 million range, this
means $160 to $200 million in additional Icoal aid dollars
for future years.
The key question is how such additional dollars will be
distributed to the cities and towns and what impact will the
distributional mechanisms have on Boston.
Boston, like all cities and towns in Massachusetts,
receives state aid in two forms—reimbursements and
distributions. Reimbursements for programs such as school
building assistance simply repays the municipality for money
already spent and at prescribed rates of incentive to
encourage the achievement of certain program goals.
Distributions, on the other hand, are periodic allocations
based on formulas which consider the relative fiscal
capacity and fiscal need of municipalities in Massachusetts.
When City of Boston officials discuss the issue of
additional state aid, their comments focus mainly on
distributional aid.
5]
Presently, the Dukakis administration is reviewing the
distributional formulas and the prevailing definitions of
fiscal need and capacity. The outcome of this review will
have a significant effect on the City's future receipts of
distributional aid.
In fiscal 1982 and 1983, Boston received 19% of the
total amount of state aid distribution in excess of prior
year commitments. Under the two major distribution
formulas, (School Aid - Chapter 70, and Lottery Aid -
Equalized Municipal Grant) Boston's share of the statewide
pie is approximately 13%. The difference is due to the
deliberate decision of State elected officials in the last
two years to skew more aid to those communities that were
suffering from relatively large losses of property tax
revenue under Proposition 2 1/2. Although the 1985 fiscal
year v;ill be the first since fiscal 1982 that Boston will
not be reducing its property tax levy, the City needs to
protect itself against any erosion of its share of
incremental state aid and its overall proportion of
aggregate financial assistance from the Commonewalth . As
the State's capital city, Boston has 9% of the State's
population and 9% of the State's property tax base, but
generates about 20% of the state's gross product. The value
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of tax-exempt property in Boston (the Commonwealth is the
largest owner of tax-exempt land) reached a total of almost
$11 billion in 1982, of which over half is owned by the
State, educational institutions and medical institutions.
5. Local Non-Property Tax Options
For the City of Boston, there are a number of options
for local taxes that would not adversely affect its
competitive posture and could raise some additional revenue
for the Ctiy. The options presented below do not include a
city income tax because such a tax is not constitutionally
permitted. In addition we do not consider a city sales tax
because we think that a city sales tax would harm Boston's
economy given that Boston represents such a small
geographical segment of a densely-populated regional
economy. In presenting our list of options, we considered
those local tax sources which would not hurt Boston
competively and which would not, in our opinion, have
regressive impacts.
6, Parking Excise Tax
Unlike many other large central cities across the
country, Boston does not have the ability to levy a tax on
the parking fees charged for off-street parking in
highly-congested downtown, non-residential areas. Such a
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tax was first proposed for Boston in 1977. At that time,
the average downtown parking fee was $2.25 per dayl In the
past six years, however, excluding the fees charged in
municipally-owned garages, this fee has more than tripled.
Competively, such a tax would have little impact on demand
for parking space, because of the limited alternatives for
the parker. Also, it seems only fair that the City should
benefit from the additional garage revenues being generated
by more aggressive enforcement of on-street parking
regulations
.
A parking tax based on a maximum of 20% of the basic
charge for parking will annually yield between $13 to $15
million for the City.
7. Hotel/Motel Excise Tax
Currently, the State levies a 5.7% room occupancy tax
upon the transfer of rooms in hotels and motels throughout
the state. Effective August 1, 1982, in accordance with the
1982 Funding Loan Act, the State began to send to Boston
that portion of the 5.7% occupancy tax paid in the City on
rooms first opened for patronage after August 1, 1981.
These funds are being used to help pay the principal and
interest costs on "Tregor" indebtedness. When these 10-year
bonds are finally liquidated, the dedication and payment of
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the hotel/motel excise tax to the City automatically expires
(1992). Prior to August 1, 1981, there were almost 7C00
hotel/motel rooms in Boston. At a tax rate of 5.7% the
revenue yield to the state was estimated at just over $7
million annually. The number of hotel/motel rooms in Boston
are expected to increase each year through fiscal 1986 to
reach a total of over 11,000.
Table X presents the number of rooms and the estimated
tax yields based on a 5.7% occupancy tax rate. The yields
for the rooms added after August 1, 1981 are also shown.
Table X: Yield From a Hotel/Motel Excise Tax
Fiscal Base Hotel Tax Yield Additional Yield
Year Rooms at 5.7% Rooms at 5.7%
1983 7000 $7.1 m 1332 $1.4 m
1984 7000 7.7 3281 2.8
1985 7000 8.5 3921 4.3
1986 7000 9.4 4421 5.4
Source: Additional Pooms and Yields . Official Statement
city of Boston , January 1, 1983. Base rooms are authors'
calcu] at ions
.
The revenue yieJd from these "additional rooms" is
already dedicated to the retirement of the "Tregor" bonds
and to the payments of interest thereon. One possible
optior available to the City requiring state legislative
approval would be to recapture the occupancy tax yield from
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base hotel/motel rooms for the City's own treasury. If the
City were entitled to the revenues from the 5.7% occupancy
tax on rooms existing prior to August 1, 1981 for General
Fund purposes plus the tax yield from additional rooms after
the "Tregor" bonds were redeemed, the total estimated
revenue of $14.8 million would be of significant financial
assistance in the future.
It should also be noted that the 5.7% room occupancy
tax is low in comparison to tax rates of other states. At
an adjusted level of 8%, the City's yield for fiscal 1985
and 1986 would be $11.9 million and $13.2 million
respectively.
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8. Payroll Excise Tax
One tax which has been suggested for Boston and/or for
the regional MBTA district to pay for the local share of the
MBTA deficit is a payroll excise tax levied on an employer
as a percentage levy on the payroll of their employees. It
would apply only to employers with annual payrolls over
certain dollar amounts and could not be passed on directly
to employees. A payroll tax levied in Boston at 1% would
yield over $50 million while a 1% levy within the MBTA
district would more than cover the local share of the MBTA
deficit.
While one of the authors, when working for the City,
was instrumental in advocating this tax, it was always seen
as a means of dramatizing the fact that suburban residents
occupied over 300,000 of the 550,000 jobs in Boston. The
issue was raised to demonstrate one of the reasons why
Boston deserved a larger share of the state aid pie.
To impose the tax within the City, there could be
negative effects on the City's ability to compete for and
retain smaller businesses which could locate just as well
beyond the City's borders. In addition, it could adversely
affect the location of new manufacturing or industrial jobs
within the City, the kinds of jobs which can best help
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Boston residents.
Imposing the tax within the MBTA district would
certainly lessen our concerns about the City's competitive
posture, but would raise similar concerns for those
communities located just beyound the borders of the MBTA
district. For these reasons, we do not believe that the
payroll tax should be pursued as a local tax option for
Boston.*
*We do believe, however, that Boston's role as a major
employer of the metropolitan area be recognized in the
distribution of state aid. See Slavet (1982). Also the
payroll tax has merit as a state-wide tax.
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VII. Recommendations
We have shown in this paper that although little or no
significant gap between revenues and expenditures exists for
fiscal 1984, this occurance is due solely to the
availability of over $80 million of one-time revenue sources
which are not likely to be available in 1985 or 1986. Our
prognostication is that the gap between steady-state
expenditure needs and operating revenues will be $48 million
in 1985 and $34 million in 1986, The assumptions underlying
this analysis are painstakingly detailed and the key
variables are highlighted.
It is our belief that this analysis will generate
decisions to change the very results we have estimated,
hopefully to the side of lower (or no) deficits, through
recognition and action to solve these problems.
Nevertheless, the next Administration will face a financial
dilemma which must be resolved before bolder programs and
service initiatives can be formulated. Although 1984 will
bring a new Mayor and Administration to City Hall, fiscal
policy issues will dominate the foreseeable future.
The budget plan for 1984 is set. In addition to
maintaining and/or adjusting the course set by the current
administration, the next City Administration must move
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immediately in two areas. First, in order to naximize the
potential contribution of economic growth to the tax levy,
the next Administration should focus immediately on
identifying the detail of such growth and estimating its
market value and and translation into assessed value.
Second, it should inject itself into the widening
deliberations on how state aid will be distributed to cities
and towns, particularly Boston, for fiscal 1985.
The first item is wholly in the area of self-help, and
good staff appointments and quality management can
accomplish this task. A fair share of state aid for Boston
will depend to a large extent on the City's political
ability to make its own case, particularly in what has
always been a difficult arena. As mentioned earlier, the
City has been receiving about 1S% of total state aid
distributions in recent years. If nothing is done to revise
the distribution formulas, this will fall to approximately
13%; however, the need is to increase the City's share to
match its contribution to the Commonwealth's economy, its
relatively large financial requirements and the restrictions
on its property tax raising capacity because of the
extraordinary high proportion of land occupied by tax-exempt
property.
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Our additional recommendations for the incoming
Administration are categorized by Self-Help and State-Help
options.
SELF-HELP
1. To prevent the balancing of a single year's tax
rate at the expense of subsequent tax rates, the incoming
City Administration should prepare and make public a
comprehensive and balanced financial plan for the 1984 to
1986 fiscal years similar to the analytical exercise
presented in this report.
This three-year plan should update the original
estimates for fiscal 1984 to reflect changes necessary for
averting any incipient operating deficit and to incorporate
unanticipated fiscal developn'ents
.
For the 1985 and 1986 fiscal years the expenditure and
revenue estimates should be based on realistic assumptions.
Thus the expenditure estimates should include adequate
appropriations for employee benefits and court judgements
and claims, thereby ending past practices of
under -appropriating the requirements for these items. (For
the 1983 fiscal year, actual expenditures and encumbances
were $13.1 million in excess of budget allowances, thus
accounting for about 80 percent of the City's total
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appropriation deficit.) Estimates of local receipts should
be based on actual collections from these sources, except
where the evidence clearly supports any deviations from such
conservative policy.
2. All or most of the personnel costs for collective
bargaining settlements affecting expenditure requirements
for the 1984 fiscal year should be financed from savings
generated from payroll reductions and from unencumbered
appropriation balances of prior years.
Personnel vacancies in non-critical positions should be
left unfilled and payroll attrition should be fostered by
adopting retirement incentives, productivity enhancement
mechanisms and alternative service delivery systems that
will help shrink the City's work force and improve the cost
and effectiveness of City Services.
3. The new City Administration should adopt firm
policies and schedules for retention and/or disposition of
the $20 million in appropriation reserves so that this
set-aside is used effectively for averting potential
appropriation and/or revenue deficiencies.
4. Excess proceeds from the sale of City assets should
not be used as revenues for current operations, but should
go into a stabilization fund. Section 5B, C40, Mass, G.L.
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authorizes cities, towns and districts to appropriate in any
one year up to 10% of the prior year's tax levy for a
stabilization fund and allows the aggregate amount in the
fund at any time to total up to 10% of the valuation of a
city or town for financing such capital outlays as
automotive equipment and other equipment with relatively
rapid depreciation, sidewalk and street reconstruction, and
deferred building maintenance and repair. These are
regularly recurring capital requirements of the City and the
high interest costs incurred in issuing bonds for these
purposes can thereby be avoided.
As Boston's fiscal condition improves, the City should
appropriate funds in its current budget to supplement for
capital purposes the accumulations of proceeds from the sale
of surplus City assets.
STATE-HELP
1. The Legislature should assume financing of transit
services throughout the state, in all metropolitan areas
including the Boston area. (For Boston this would relieve
the property tax levy of almost $40 million a year.)
2. The Legislature should authorize the Commonwealth
to integrate county correctional institutions into the
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statewide correctional system, at an estimated state cost of
$40 million a year, providing about $14 million a year in
property tax relief to the City of Boston.
3. If the Legislature is reluctant to enact only part
of the above package of recommendations, it should
substitute a limited set of local excise tax options that
any city or town could adopt, options that would have
minimum adverse impact on local economies. Two that make
sense for Boston are:
a. A parking excise tax applicable to parking
facilities in non-residential areas. A 20%
parking excise tax in Boston, for example, would
raise an estimated $13 million a year.
b. A 2.3% supplement of the current state excise
tax of 5.7% on hotel and motel accommodations
applicable to rooms opened for patronage after
August 1, 1981; plus, at 8%, the total yield of
the occupancy tax on all pre-1981 rooms.
For Boston, such a hotel/motel excise
surcharge would raise an estimated $13.2 million
in fiscal 1985 and increase to $14.3 million in
1986.
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